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I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND LGBT RIGHTS: AN UNEASY MARRIAGE
MATTHEW W. GREEN JR.∗
A. Introduction
Good afternoon and thank you for joining us today for our conference on the
Politicization of Judicial Elections and Its Effect on Judicial Independence and
LGBT Rights. I thought that I would briefly explain the idea behind today’s
program and some of the issues that our panelists will be addressing before turning
the program over to them. As the program title suggests, today’s program marries
∗
Assistant Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; LL.M., Columbia University,
Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, Magna Cum Laude;
B.A., University of Maryland, College Park; law clerk to the Hon. Eric L. Clay, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2001-2002 and the Hon. Deborah K. Chasanow, U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland, 2000-2001. We would like to extend a special thanks to
the Cleveland-Marshall Fund for providing the financial support that made this program
possible. In addition, we extend a very special thank you to the cosponsors of this event: the
Cleveland-Marshall Allies; the Ohio American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); the American
Constitution Society (ACS) Northeast Ohio Chapter; and the Cleveland State University’s
Office of Diversity and Multicultural Affairs.
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two themes—judicial independence and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgendered (“LGBT”) individuals, who often turn to the courts to protect their
civil rights. This conference will explore the importance of an independent judiciary
to the hot-button issue of same-sex marriage or marriage equality.
The idea for this conference stemmed from the November 2010 Iowa judicial
election, in which three justices were voted out of office as a result of joining a
unanimous ruling, Varnum v. Brien, that struck down, on equal protection grounds, a
state statute limiting marriage rights to heterosexual couples.1 That decision
spawned a backlash, including a huge influx of money from out-of-state special
interest groups used to urge voters to oust the judges based on their decision in
Varnum. What was remarkable about Iowa is that for the first time since Iowa
adopted its current system of electing judges, sitting Supreme Court justices were
voted out of office and, undisputedly, were voted out of office because of a judicial
ruling.2
Some who called for the ouster justified it by contending that the election sent a
message that power resides with the people—presumably of Iowa—and not with the
courts, and by claiming that the ouster was warranted as Varnum was the product of
activist judges. It is not clear, however, that such assertions withstand scrutiny. To
the extent the ouster was intended to demonstrate the power of the people, one
wonders what “people” are being referenced? The campaign to unseat the justices
was financed heavily by non-Iowan interest groups, including the Washington D.C.based Citizens United and Family Research Council (“FRC”); the New Jersey-based
National Organization for Marriage (“NOM”); and the Mississippi-based American
Family Association (“AFA”).3 NOM and AFA, alone, reportedly contributed around
seven hundred thousand of the nearly million dollars that was spent on the campaign
to oust the justices.4 A quick Google search demonstrates that several of these
groups are vehemently opposed to same-sex marriage and other legal protections for
LGBT individuals. The organizations waged a highly visible non-retention
campaign. FRC, for instance, sponsored a twenty city bus tour and NOM spent
more than four hundred thousand dollars for TV advertisements urging voters to oust
the justices.5 It takes no great leap of logic to conclude that these groups were
voicing their own anti-LGBT message in Iowa as they had done in other states. To
be sure, the anti-marriage equality message resonated with a segment of Iowa voters.
It is also clear, however, that the “power” evidenced by the judicial ouster was
wielded to a large degree by well-funded, out-of-state interest groups whose voices
were loudly heard in Iowa and elsewhere.
1

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).

2

See TODD E. PETTYS, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715, 715-16 (2011).
3

See id. at 728.

4

See id.

5

See Andy Kopsa, National Anti-Gay Groups Unite to Target Iowa Judges, IOWA
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 21, 2010, available at http://iowaindependent.com/45701/national-antigay-groups-unite-to-target-iowa-judges. See also Andy Kopsa, Anti-retention Leaders: Iowa
Just the Start of National Gay Marriage Battle, IOWA INDEPENDENT, Oct. 29, 2010, available
at http://iowaindependent.com/46519/anti-retention-leaders-iowa-just-the-start-of-gay-marriag
e-battle.
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More baffling is the charge that Varnum was the product of activist (presumably
liberal) judges. As noted earlier, the decision was unanimous. Judges appointed to
the bench by both political parties joined the opinion. Indeed, two of the justices
voted out of office were appointed by Democratic governors and the third, one of our
panelists and honored guests this afternoon, former Chief Justice Marsha K. Ternus,
was appointed by a Republican governor. More importantly, it is not clear whether
anyone who has actually read the Varnum opinion would call it a product of
activists. Professor Todd Pettys has remarked that what makes the Iowa experience
so problematic is that, no matter what one’s political preferences might be on the
issue of same-sex marriage, one who reads Varnum will find that the court’s
reasoning fell well within the parameters of established methods of constitutional
analysis. As Professor Pettys aptly states, “[t]he three justices did not lose their jobs
by violating widely embraced conventions of constitutional reasoning[; r]ather they
lost their jobs by reaching a conclusion that many citizens found morally and
politically objectionable.”6
Accepting Professor Pettys’ position regarding the settled constitutional analysis
at work in Varnum, then at bottom, sitting justices were voted off the bench not for
being activists, but for deciding a case based on the facts and the law and by
employing reasoning that fell within the scope of accepted equal protection analysis.
That unprecedented occurrence sparked the idea for this conference. The conference
addresses, among other things, whether the backlash that occurred in Iowa after the
Varnum decision might undermine judicial independence in jurisdictions where
judges are elected.
B. Judicial Independence
Judicial independence has been defined in numerous ways, and our panelists will
explore some of the ways in which the term has been defined. But one way in which
judicial independence has been defined is as a condition in which judges are free
from negative political consequences, such as being voted out of office, as a result of
decisions made from the bench.7 Judges, of course, take an oath of office to uphold
the constitution and uphold the rule of law without respect of person. In rendering a
decision on a hot-button issue, however, it is unquestionably difficult to ignore the
political consequences of that decision, particularly when those consequences might
mean a campaign to unseat you. Former California Supreme Court justice Otto Kaus
put the threat of negative political consequences on judicial independence this way:
“‘There’s no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of
certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near election time. That
would be like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub.’”8
Many states, including Ohio, use some form of elections to select and to retain
judges, although the types of elections often differ from state to state. Since the
early 1960s, for instance, Iowa has used a merit-selection and retention system to

6

PETTYS, supra note 2, at 717.

7

See LAWRENCE BAUM, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter’s
Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 14 (2003).
8

Id. at 39 n.113 (quoting Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987,
at 52, 58).
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select and retain its Supreme Court justices.9 After an initial appointment to the
bench, the justices retain their seats by running unopposed in periodic elections. To
remain on the bench they must receive a vote of at least 50 percent of all votes cast.
It is commonly assumed that judges should be least vulnerable to political pressure
under a system that uses retention elections as, among other things, judges run
unopposed and have little obvious need to campaign or raise funds.10 Yet, as more
and more money from interest groups pours into judicial elections of all kinds in an
effort to influence the outcome of the election, one wonders whether that assumption
is correct or will remain so in the future? Moreover, if interest groups are
increasingly successful in their efforts to unseat judges, as they were in Iowa, what
effect might that have in other states where judges are elected and are also
adjudicating hot-button issues?
We are fortunate to have with us today Daniel Takoji, professor of law at the
Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law, who will discuss, among other
things, the role of money in judicial elections and more broadly its effect on judicial
independence.
C. Marriage Equality
Despite the breadth of issues that might galvanize special interests to funnel
money into judicial elections to unseat judges who vote “the wrong way,” this
conference takes a look at the potential effect of the Iowa ouster on judicial
independence through the prism of same-sex marriage, which remains a hot-button
social issue, and of course was the issue the court dealt with in Varnum. Minorities,
including LGBT individuals—like the plaintiffs in Varnum—often have resorted to
the courts to vindicate their civil rights under federal and state law. We focus here
on the effect that the Iowa ouster might have on efforts to advance LGBT rights in
state courts where judges are often elected. Currently, a majority of states use some
form of election system to select and/or to retain judges.
Some have argued that marriage equality is the civil rights issue of the day. If
that is so, it stands to reason that LGBT individuals would turn to the courts to
protect their legal rights as other minority groups traditionally have done.
Considering what occurred in Iowa, however, might courts be inclined to rule a
particular way on marriage equality or LGBT rights more broadly considering the
political consequences of doing otherwise? What other factors, if any, might affect
judges grappling with LGBT-rights issues?
D. Symposium Structure
The panelists will address the issues I’ve raised and others pertaining to judicial
independence and LGBT rights. Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Professor
Susan Becker will begin the discussion. After providing a thoughtful overview of
the struggle for LGBT rights, she will discuss various factors that likely have
influenced and will continue to influence judicial independence when addressing
LGBT rights. We also are fortunate to have with us today Camilla Taylor, of
9
See PETTYS, supra note 2, at 716. See also Hallie Sears, Note, A New Approach to
Judicial Retention: Where Expertise Meets Democracy, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 871, 871-72
(2011).
10

See Sears, supra note 9, at 875.
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Lambda Legal, who successfully litigated the Varnum decision through the Iowa
courts, and who will discuss her efforts in Iowa prior to litigating the Varnum case
and we expect will address whether the backlash that occurred after Varnum might
affect Lambda’s efforts to challenge laws affecting LGBT rights in other states
where judges are elected.
After hearing from Professors Becker and Takoji and Ms. Taylor, we’ll hear
remarks from the Hon. Marsha K. Ternus, who we are extremely honored to have
with us today. Justice Ternus was caught in the maelstrom that occurred in Iowa
after the court’s decision in Varnum. She will recount her experience and offer her
unique perspective on whether politicized judicial elections might undermine judicial
independence.
I’ll begin things with a brief question: Might politicized judicial elections
negatively affect judicial independence and LGBT rights? Taking Justice Kaus’
views on the matter at face value, one might respond with “it might, but I hope it
does not.” We look forward to exploring this issue today and to a provocative
discussion.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF LGBT EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
SUSAN J. BECKER∗
A. Introduction
Today’s program is part of the “transformative dialogue” series offered at the
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law this academic year. I have the honor of
commencing the dialogue by providing background information on two topics: first,
the current status of the LGBT rights movement with primary focus on marriage
equality, and second, the role that judicial independence—or perhaps the lack
thereof—has played in advancing and impeding this civil rights movement.
1. Brief History of the LGBT Equality Movement
We cannot fully comprehend the current legal landscape as experienced by
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons without a brief glance in the
rear view mirror. Although the 1969 riots at the Stonewall Inn in New York City are
often cited as the birth of the LGBT civil rights movement in this country, its origins
can be traced much further back.
More than four decades before Stonewall, a young Army veteran named Henry
Gerber incorporated The Society for Human Rights in Illinois. The Society is
generally acknowledged as the first gay rights organization in the United States.11
Shortly after the Society was founded in 1924, Gerber and several other members

∗

Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
Professor Becker’s areas of teaching and scholarship include Sexual Orientation and the Law,
and she maintains a modest pro bono practice focusing primarily on legal issues presented by
LGBT clients. Professor Becker also serves as Board President for the ACLU of Ohio, a cosponsor of this conference.
11
JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A.:
A DOCUMENTARY 386-87 (1976); STEVE HOGAN & LEE HUDSON, COMPLETELY QUEER: THE
GAY AND LESBIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 244 (1998).
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were arrested and charged with deviancy. After three trials, Gerber was acquitted.12
He then reenlisted in the Army and served his country for an additional seventeen
years.13
In the 1950s, courageous souls such as Phyllis Lyons and Del Martin formed the
Daughters of Bilitis14 in San Francisco while Harry Hay and others founded the
Mattachine Society in Los Angeles.15 One of the most amazing aspects of these and
other early advocacy groups is that they flourished even while the rabidly anti-gay
clouds of McCarthyism cast dark shadows over the land. Nonetheless, LGBT rights
pioneers fought for the repeal of discriminatory laws and policies and for the
recognition of lesbians and gay men as healthy and productive members of society.
The challenges faced by these trailblazers were daunting. Historically, the law in
this country has not looked favorably upon LGBT citizens. In its most benign form,
the law simply pretended that the United States was populated exclusively with
heterosexual persons, thus finding no reason to recognize constitutional or other
rights of non-heterosexuals. In its harshest form, the law penalized and punished
anyone who dared stray from the classic heterosexual paradigm, including
transgender or transsexual persons who challenged the conventional binary view of
gender as either exclusively masculine or feminine.
As a result, LGBT parents were routinely denied custody and visitation of their
children. LGBT employees terminated from employment due to their sexual
orientation or gender identity had no legal recourse for wrongful termination. Samesex couples who had been in committed relationships for decades were, in the eyes
of the law, complete strangers to one another. Adults engaging in intimate,
consensual, same-sex sexual conduct could be criminally prosecuted under state
sodomy laws.
The work of Lyons, Martin, Hay, and other early advocates ultimately led to the
American Psychiatric Association’s decision to no longer define homosexuality as a
mental illness,16 the repeal of many state sodomy laws, and a gradual shift in this
country’s collective consciousness about gender identity and sexual orientation.
Successive generations of advocates built on these achievements to create the
modern socio-political-legal environment for LGBT citizens.
Consequently, the modern legal landscape for LGBT citizens is very different
than the one encountered by Gerber and his colleagues more than eight decades ago.
Nonetheless, the legal rights and recognition of LGBT persons in the U.S. today are
largely dependent on geography. States in the Northeast and the West Coast provide
the greatest rights, while Southern states have proven the least receptive to LGBT
equality.

12

Henry
Gerber,
CHICAGO
GAY
AND
LESBIAN
HALL
OF
FAME,
http://www.glhalloffame.org/ index.pl?item=18&todo=view_item (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
13

Id.

14

KAY TOBIN & RANDY WICKER, THE GAY CRUSADERS 50 (1975).

15

CHARLES KAISER, THE GAY METROPOLIS: 1940-1996, at 122-23 (1997).

16

Id. at 123-24, 235-40.
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2. Current Status of LGBT Equality in the United States
Legal recognition of same-sex relationships both illustrates the geographic
divides in this country and serves as a barometer for both how far the LGBT equality
movement has come and how far it has to go.
As of January 2012,17 six states and the District of Columbia (as of 2010) allow
same sex couples to wed. The states and the year that this major milestone was
achieved are Massachusetts (2004), Connecticut (2008), Iowa (2009), Vermont
(2009), New Hampshire (2010), and New York (2011).
Nine states offer state-level spousal rights to same-sex couples that are equivalent
to marriage rights. These are California (domestic partnerships, effective in 1999,
expanded in 2005), Delaware (civil unions, effective 2012), Hawaii (civil unions,
effective 2012), Illinois (civil unions, 2011) Nevada (domestic partnerships, 2009),
New Jersey (civil unions, 2007), Oregon (domestic partnerships, 2008), Rhode
Island (civil unions, 2011), and Washington (domestic partnerships, established
2007, expanded in 2009). Colorado (2009), Maine (2004) and Wisconsin (2009)
offer selective spousal rights to same-sex couples.
The ongoing fight for LGBT relationship recognition repeatedly teaches the
lesson that achieving a civil rights victory comes with no guarantee of retaining
those rights. California provides a classic case study. Although it may seem hard to
believe, the following presentation is actually an abridged version of California’s
history related to same-sex marriage.
3. California’s Marriage Wars
California established limited domestic partner benefits in 1999. In 2002,
however, California voters approved Proposition 22, the California Defense of
Marriage Act, or California “DOMA.” Proposition 22 amended California’s family
law statute to clarify that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California.”18
In February 2004, the mayor of San Francisco directed officials to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. Within a month, the California Supreme Court
declared that San Francisco did not have the power to issue marriage licenses that
were not authorized by state statute.19 The court did not, however, address the issue
of whether the statute prohibiting same-sex marriage (i.e. the law established by
Proposition 22) violated the state’s constitution. San Francisco and other parties
then initiated state court actions challenging California’s exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage. These state constitutional challenges were consolidated for
trial.
In 2005, the trial court held that excluding same-sex couples from marriage
violated California’s equal protection guarantees.20 The California legislature also
17

The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) website contains extensive information about the
current status of LGBT equality in marriage and other forms of relationship recognition,
adoption, employment and other areas of the law. See http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry
/maps-of-state-laws-policies.
18

CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5.

19

Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).

20

In re Coordination Proceeding, 2005 WL 583129, at *1, *2 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
March 14, 2005).
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significantly expanded domestic partner rights for same-sex couples that year. A
California intermediate appeals court then reversed the trial court in a 2-1 decision,
again invalidating same-sex marriage.
In May 2008, the California Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s decision
striking down California’s Defense of Marriage Act, concluding in a 4-3 decision
that same-sex marriage must be recognized under the state constitution.21
Approximately eighteen thousand same-sex couples then married in California.
Backlash to the California Supreme Court’s decision was immediate and fierce.
With significant monetary and other support from out-of-state backers, a referendum
known as Proposition 8 was placed on California’s November 2008 ballot. Its
passage amended the California constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage.
The California Supreme Court rejected the writ of mandamus filed by
Proposition 8 opponents who complained that the initiative process used to amend
the constitution violated the state constitution.22 However, the court left intact the
eighteen thousand same-sex marriages that occurred in California between the
California Supreme Court’s decision allowing same-sex marriage and the passage of
Proposition 8 negating the right of same-sex couples to marry.
Proposition 8’s amendment to California’s constitution was then challenged in
federal court by six same-sex couples who alleged that the state’s denial of their
right to marry violated their federal constitutional rights to equal protection and
substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. A federal district
court agreed with the plaintiffs and invalidated California’s constitutional
amendment in 2010.23 That decision is currently being reviewed by the Ninth
Circuit. The federal constitutional issues presented by this case are expected to
ultimately be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.
4. Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions in Other States
A U.S. Supreme Court decision clarifying the impact of the federal constitution
on state marriage laws would have far reaching impact, as twenty-eight states in
addition to California have state constitutional provisions prohibiting same-sex
marriage, and twelve additional states have legislation limiting marriage to one man
and one woman.24 Some of the state constitutional amendments prohibit much more
than just same-sex marriage. The Ohio amendment is a case in point.
Ohio was one of twelve states that amended its constitution to prohibit same-sex
marriage via a ballot initiative approved by voters in November 2004.25 The Ohio
21

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008), reh’g denied 2008 Cal. LEXIS
6807 (Cal. June 4, 2008). The court’s 79-page opinion concluded that the California
Constitution’s guarantees of liberty and personal autonomy include the fundamental right to
form a family relationship, that sexual orientation discrimination affects a suspect class
requiring heightened scrutiny, and that denying marriage licenses to same sex couples violates
their state constitutional equal protection rights.
22

Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009).

23

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

24

See Human Rights Campaign, Maps of State Laws & Policies: Statewide Marriage
Prohibition Laws (2010), http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies.pdf.
25
Other states enacting constitutional same sex marriage bans in 2004 were Arkansas,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota,
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amendment was unnecessary, as state law already limited marriage to a man and a
woman. In addition, there was zero probability that the conservative justices on the
Supreme Court of Ohio would interpret the state constitution to invalidate that law.
Nonetheless, voters overwhelming approved the addition of this language to Ohio’s
constitution:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid
in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and
its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.26
The full impact of such broad bans is being litigated in state courts in Ohio and
elsewhere. A number of pending federal cases also challenge the constitutionality of
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),27 the legislation passed by Congress
in 1996 to prohibit the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages.
DOMA also empowers states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages deemed
legal in their sister states. The role of the judiciary in advancing or limiting the
movement towards LGBT equality has perhaps never been more obvious than in the
courts’ past and future considerations of federal constitutional challenges to state and
federal DOMAs.
B. Judicial Independence Overview
There is no doubt that state and federal legislators and other elected government
officials have played a major role in the advancement of LGBT equality. Recent
examples include Congress’s repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy
to allow gay and lesbian service members to be open about their sexual orientation,
the enactment by more than twenty-one state legislatures of laws prohibiting
workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation, and the New York
legislature’s approval of same-sex marriage. Nonetheless, it is impossible to
overstate the critical role that judges have played in both extending and in limiting
legal rights and recognition to LGBT persons and their families.
The specific role that judicial independence—or perhaps the lack thereof—has
played in these decisions remains unclear. Any assessment of the role of judicial
independence in cases involving LGBT parties necessarily requires establishing a
common understanding of the term “judicial independence.”
1. Definition and Virtues of Judicial Independence
Vast literature on the subject offers many definitions, but all of them share this
commonality: Judicial independence requires a judge to apply the established “rule
of law” to the specific facts of the case in a neutral and unbiased manner. This
produces a decision that is fair, just, largely predictable, and impartial.
More specifically, judicial independence demands that judicial decision-making
be free from extraneous influences such as the judge’s personal interests, political
Oklahoma, Oregon and Utah. Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska and Nevada had already banned
same-sex marriage. Id.
26

OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.

27

1 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
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ideology, religious beliefs, desire to please special interest groups and campaign
donors, financial considerations, and fear of retaliation for unpopular decisions. The
eradication of such extraneous forces results in judicial decisions that serve the best
interests of the litigants and of society.
Judicial independence is especially important in a democracy where the will of
the majority can suppress minority views and rights. In drafting his famous essays
intended to convince New York and other colonies to adopt the federal Constitution,
Alexander Hamilton extolled the virtue of lifetime appointments of federal judges as
the most effective means of assuring judicial independence. Hamilton cited
“complete independence of the courts of justice” as critical to protecting citizens’
Constitutional rights, especially when the majority that holds sway in Congress
enacts legislation harming the rights of the minorities.28
Of course judicial independence is not a uniquely American concept. It is a
widely embraced tenet of international law. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, for example, proclaims that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of
his rights and obligations . . . .”29
2. The Formalism-Realism Debate
A clear definition and pervasive conviction of the virtue of judicial independence
does not mean, however, that judicial independence is easily achieved, or even
capable of measuring or monitoring. Indeed, one of the most frequently debated
issues here and around the world is whether judicial independence is a desirable
aspiration rather than an attainable objective. This debate has historically been
framed by the “formalism” and “realism” schools of thought.
Formalists posit that judges are capable of applying the rule of law to any given
set of facts in a somewhat detached and mechanical manner, thus rendering a truly
independent—and of course just—decision.30 Realists counter that judges are
political actors whose decisions are universally and inevitably informed by
extraneous considerations and biases.31 As is often the cases with opposing schools
of thought, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.32
Extensive empirical studies of judicial decisions conducted primarily by political
scientists yields support for an “attitudinal” model of judicial decision making in
which jurists’ individual characteristics and world views greatly influence case
outcomes.33 These studies tend to offer support for the realism rather than formalism
28

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 508-09 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Meade Earl ed.,
1937).
29

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. X (1948).

30

See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (describing formalist
American thought). See also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
31

See FRANK, supra note 30; Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence — The Next Step,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
32
The middle ground between formalism and realism is thoughtfully negotiated in BRIAN
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 3 (2010).
33

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWAKI,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 147 (2006).
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theory. As is the case with all empirical studies, however, these data and
conclusions drawn from them are subject to calculation error, researcher biases, and
other fundamental flaws. In short, it is not entirely clear whether the judicial biases
that researchers commonly find are grounded at least in part in the researchers’ own
biases.
C. Inherent Impediments to Judicial Independence
My review of the extensive literature on the topic of judicial independence, as
well as my own experience as both an academic and practitioner, inform my view
that there are at least five major impediments inherent in our justice system that
thwart even the best intentioned judges’ efforts to achieve true independence in their
decision-making processes.
1. Choosing the Applicable Law
The first obstacle to independently applying the “rule of law” is that the
applicable rule is not always obvious. Judges often must select the determinative
legal authority from a universe of potential complementary and sometimes
conflicting rules of law. Once the most appropriate rule is selected, the judge must
interpret and apply that law in a manner that conforms as closely as possible to
precedent. But “following precedent” is challenging, if not impossible, when the
rule is invoked to resolve a novel situation.
This dilemma is a recurring issue in cases involving LGBT litigants, especially
when those litigants seek extension of state or federal constitutional rights routinely
afforded heterosexual citizens. What do intrinsically ill-defined constitutional terms
such as “liberty,” “due process,” and “equal protection” encompass on an abstract
basis? And how do constitutional guarantees grounded in this language apply to
citizens whose group identity was nonexistent at the time the constitutions were
drafted?34
If judges decide that fundamental rights do not apply to LGBT persons, then their
decisions empower state and federal governments to enact laws and policies that
disenfranchise a discrete minority. This is precisely what Alexander Hamilton and
other founders promised the constitution would not tolerate. If judges extend
fundamental rights to LGBT litigants, they must endure the wrath of critics who
claim that judges are rewriting state and federal constitutions instead of interpreting
them. Clearly the decisions judges make extending or denying rights to LGBT
people must be influenced by something other than the existing, ill-fitting and vague
rules of law.
2. Intentional Vagueness of Legal Rules and Standards
The second obstacle is that even when the choice of applicable rule is clear, it
may be intentionally vague. For example, judges whose dockets consist of child
34

For a discussion of the development of the legal and social identify of LGBT persons,
see Susan J. Becker, Many are Chilled but Few are Frozen: How Transformative Learning in
Popular Culture, Christianity, and Science will Lead to the Eventual Demise of Legally
Sanctioned Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the United States, 14 AM. U. J.
GENDER & LAW 177, 193-200 (2006); Larry Cata Backer, Constructing a “Homosexual” For
Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and
British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 529 (1996).
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custody, visitation, and adoption matters must render decisions that are “in the best
interests of the child.”35 This standard is borne of necessity, as judges must consider
myriad factors and navigate often-conflicting factual and expert evidence to arrive at
a decision that best protects the children’s health and general welfare.
Well into the 1980s, many state courts embraced a per se rule that exposure to a
gay or lesbian parent harmed a child.36 Courts have rejected this harsh rule,
replacing it with the “best interest of the child” standard that had long applied to
heterosexual parents.37 This change has been heralded as a major victory for LGBT
persons, and rightly so. But one must not lose sight of the fact that judges applying
this “enlightened” standard still retain tremendous discretion to determine a child’s
(and parent’s) fate.38
Stated more bluntly, a judge who believes that homosexual parents pose a per se
harm to their children can conceal that bias through a series of credibility and other
evidentiary decisions required by the “best interest” rubric. In a classic “death by a
thousand paper cuts” scenario, these rulings may unfairly demean the LBGT parent’s
childrearing skills while greatly exaggerating the skills of the heterosexual parent or
other relative seeking exclusive or primary parental rights to the child. Such beliefs
may also blind a judge to the value of the relationship between a non-biological
parent and a child that parent has raised with his or her same-sex partner for years.
Such a result is legally defensible under the “best interest” standard despite its true
grounding in the judge’s personal bias.
3. Necessity of Factual Resolution
Judges are rarely presented with litigants who agree on the critical facts of a case.
To the contrary, disputes are often litigated because the litigants have drastically
disparate conceptions of reality. And, of course, the identification of the relevant
35

Monica K. Miller, How Judges Decide Whether Social Parents Have Parental Rights: A
Five-Factor Typology, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 72, 77 (2011) (observing that courts typically “rely
on a ‘best interest of the child’ standard when deciding cases including adoption, custody, and
visitation”).
36
Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Parents with Children:
Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, 52:3 J. SOC. ISSUES 29, 33-34 (1996).
37
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J.
459, 472 (1990) (relating that child and visitation cases including those involving lesbian
parents are decided under the “best interest of the child” standard). See also Miller, supra
note 35, at 77; Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 337 (2008) (concluding that
the ubiquitous best interest of the child doctrine “is heralded because it espouses the best and
highest standard; . . . derided because it is necessarily subjective; and . . . relied upon because
there is nothing better.”).
38

Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & the State: The Construction of a New Family
Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 119-20 (2011) (noting the “inherently
subjective nature of the test, which may lead to bias,” and further observing that the best
interest standard “is purposefully broad and amorphous to ensure flexibility in application”)
(citations omitted); Kohm, supra note 37, at 339 (stating that the best interest standard “has
turned toward near pure judicial discretion in contemporary judging, causing litigators and
advocates to have no rule of law to rely upon”).
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facts of the case has a dramatic impact on both the identification of the legal
authorities that apply, discussed immediately above, and the proper framing of the
issue, discussed immediately below. Because family law cases are often tried to
judges rather than juries, the inherent challenge in divining the facts to which the law
applies is especially critical in cases involving recognition of familial relationships
among LGBT persons and their children.39
The challenge of determining who did (or did not do) something and when they
did (or did not do) it is perhaps best illustrated by television broadcasts of U.S.
football games. A wide receiver catches the ball and runs fifty yards down the
sidelines to the end zone. Five or six television cameras are trained on the runner,
recording every stride. The referee signals a touchdown. But wait . . . the opposing
coach is challenging the call, arguing that the runner stepped out of bounds at the
twenty-yard line, negating the touchdown.
Even with the aid of the multiple cameras recording reality as it unfolded, replay
officials often determine that such video evidence is “inconclusive” as to whether the
player was out of bounds. If reality cannot be ascertained despite multiple,
simultaneous video recordings of an event, how likely is it that a judge can
accurately reconstruct the facts of a case from the bits and pieces of evidence
presented in motions, during hearings, and at trial?
Unlike a football referee, a judge does not have the luxury of finding that the
evidence presented is “inconclusive.” The judge must evaluate each piece of
evidence to assess its admissibility and credibility, with each individual decision
providing a building block of the foundation on which the judge’s decision will
ultimately rest.
Once again, the significant discretion vested in judges when evaluating the
relative trustworthiness of witness testimony and other evidence allows the insidious
bias of a judge to infiltrate the proceedings in a subtle and pervasive manner. As
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor has observed, “[p]ersonal experiences
affect the facts that judges choose to see.”40
And this phenomenon is not only a danger at the trial level. As Judge Richard
Posner explained, “Appellate judges in our system often can conceal the role of
personal preferences in their decisions by stating the facts selectively, so that the
outcome seems to follow from them inevitably . . . .”41
4. Re-framing of Issues on Appeal
Any experienced litigator, and certainly those who routinely represent LGBT
clients, has likely handled cases in which dispositive legal issues incurred significant
reconstruction—or in the common vernacular, “morphed”—throughout the trial and
appeals process. Such transformations are both necessary to judicial review and
dangerous to judicial independence.
39

See, e.g., Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyoming 1995) (presenting radically
different factual conclusions by majority and dissenting judges resolving a child visitation
dispute in which mother’s sexual orientation was at issue).
40
Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002),
reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us
/politics/15judge.text.html.
41

RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 144 (Harv. Univ. Press 2008).
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Appellate judges often exercise their prerogative to correct the manner in which
litigants have framed the dispositive issues. In some instances judges must choose
between competing versions of the issues presented by the litigants. This exercise is
appropriate in situations where, for example, litigants misrepresent the standard of
review applicable to the issues raised in the appeal. It is not uncommon, for
example, for appellants to attempt to invoke heightened de novo review of the trial
court’s factual findings where the differential abuse of discretion standard is proper.
It is equally common for appellants to frame challenges to the lower court’s
evidentiary rulings as being of constitutional magnitude when those decisions are
also subject to the abuse of discretion standard.
No one seriously challenges the necessity of a judge’s prerogative to reformulate
the issues on appeal. But it must also be conceded that the judge’s exercise of this
prerogative allows a judge to inject his or her personal views on how the appeal
should be resolved. Similar to Judge Posner’s observation about judicial selectivity
of facts, a judge’s restructuring of legal issues creates the opportunity to dictate the
inevitability of the outcome.
This phenomena of issue framing dictating the outcome of the appeal is perhaps
best illustrated by two U.S. Supreme Court decisions rendered just seventeen years
apart, a mere blink of an eye in the history of constitutional law: Bowers v.
Hardwick, decided in 1983, and Lawrence v. Texas, decided in 2003. Bowers and
Lawrence both presented the Court with whether a state law criminalizing
consensual sexual conduct between two adults of the same sex violates the U.S.
Constitution.
As framed in the preceding sentence, the issue presented by Lawrence and
Bowers seems relatively narrow and straight-forward. The importance of the Court’s
answer to this question, however, extended well beyond the enforceability of the
state “sodomy” statutes at the heart of these cases. In fact, prosecutions under
sodomy statutes were quite rare by the time the Court agreed to hear Bowers, and the
majority of states had repealed their sodomy laws by the time Lawrence was
considered. But the very existence of these criminal laws in states that retained them
proved highly detrimental to LGBT litigants in civil cases.
For example, in cases where a lesbian mother was fighting for custody or
visitation with her children or a former employee was challenging termination from
public employment based solely on his or her sexual orientation, courts routinely
concluded that the “lifestyle” of the gay or lesbian litigant inevitably violated the
state’s criminal statutes forbidding sodomy. Courts had no trouble reaching these
conclusions despite no evidence in the record as to past or present sexual activities—
if any—in which the litigants engaged. This inevitable “criminal” behavior, in turn,
justified the court’s denial of a litigant’s rights to her own children or not to be fired
from a job.42 In short, the sodomy statutes at the center of the Bowers and Lawrence
42
See Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Parents with
Children: Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, 52:3 J. SOC. ISSUES 29, 33-34
(1996) (explaining courts’ historic unfavorable view of lesbians parents); Rhonda R. Rivera,
Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1978-1979) (explaining disadvantageous legal position of LGBT
persons in family law, employment law and other areas due to perception of homosexuals as
immoral and socially deviant); Anne T. Payne, The Law and the Problem Parent: Custody
and Parental Rights of Homosexual, Mentally Retarded, Mentally Ill and Incarcerated
Parents, 16 J. FAM. L. 797, 818 (1977-1978) (reporting that courts often deemed homosexuals
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appeals had implications for LGBT equality far beyond their facial boundaries.
Removing those boundaries on LGBT people had far reaching societal as well as
legal ramifications.
In framing the issues for each case, members of the Court’s majority arguably
telegraphed their personal biases related to the outcome. Justice White, writing for
Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor,
articulated the critical issue in Bowers as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the
laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time.”43
In sharp contrast, Justice Kennedy, writing for Associate Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,44 declared that Lawrence “should be resolved by
determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”45
No one was surprised when the Bowers Court answered a resounding “no” to the
issue it framed, thereby upholding state sodomy statutes, while the Lawrence Court
answered “yes” to the issue it had framed, declaring such statutes unconstitutional.
5. Judges are Human
In 2001, then-Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor offered these observations
about the many factors that influence judicial decision-making:
Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cultural
differences, . . . our gender and national origins may and will make a
difference in our judging. . . . I would hope that a wise Latina woman with
the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better
conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.46
Adding fuel to the firestorm that would ignite during her 2009 Senate confirmation
hearings for Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor
continued:
My hope is that I will take the good from my experiences and extrapolate
them further into areas with which I am unfamiliar. I simply do not know

per se unfit parents and that even parents imprisoned for committing serious crimes were
“treated to less spurious moralizing and discrimination” than were gay and lesbian parents).
43
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun’s
dissent was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 199.
44

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003). Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by
Justices Thomas and Rehnquist. Id. at 586. Justice O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, finding a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation because the Texas
statute only criminalized certain conduct between same-sex but not opposite-sex partners. Id.
at 579.
45

Id. at 564 (emphasis added).

46

Sotomayor, supra note 40, at 92.
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exactly what that difference will be in my judging. But I accept there will
be some based on my gender and my Latina heritage.47
While Justice Sotomayor’s comments from 2001 remain controversial, no one
seriously doubts the veracity of her statements. To the contrary, it is because those
statements are true that the concept of judicial independence remains subject to
debate. Every person on this planet perceives his environs through a lens formed by
place and time of birth, cultural heritage, education and work experiences, and
religious, social, and economic influences to which he or she was exposed—in short,
by the many factors that simultaneously establish each person as an individual and
connect them with communal identities. It is beyond folly to think that merely
donning a black robe or picking up a gavel causes people to shed all the influences
that make them who they are. The judges-are-humans conclusion is confirmed by
empirical studies as well as common sense. Studies conducted over decades by
political scientists consistently find significant links between judges’ individual
characteristics and the decisions they render. These data support what is known as
the “attitudinal model” of decision-making.
One of the strongest correlations repeatedly identified is the link between the
judges’ political ideology, that is, his or her position along the conservative-toliberal spectrum, and the decisions they render in cases with significant political and
social overtones, such as cases involving LGBT rights. Exhibit A for this conclusion
is the framing of the issues and accompanying issue resolution by the conservative
judge majority in Bowers compared with the issue framing and resolution by the
liberate and moderate justices in Lawrence as discussed above. Exhibit B is the
significant statistical work done by attorney and social scientist Daniel Pinello.
Pinello conducted a detailed empirical study of 468 state and federal appellate
court cases involving LGBT litigants during the 1980s and 1990s.48 Interestingly,
Pinello found support for and against the conclusion that judicial independence is
alive and well in those cases. In support of judicial independence, Pinello found that
precedent was well respected by trial and intermediate appellate courts.49 In other
words, these courts tended to follow the rule of law if one existed. Pinello also
concluded that the courts paid close attention to the facts of each case.50
In findings that affirm the attitudinal model of decision-making in cases
involving LGBT rights, Pinello’s findings include the following:
• Gender (female)51 and race (minority)52 produced significantly more
decisions favoring LGBT litigants;

47

Id.

48

DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS
2003).
49

AND

AMERICAN LAW 76-93 (Cambridge Univ. Press

Id. at 79, 82, 150.

50
Id. at 79. It is not clear whether Pinello’s methodology specifically screened for the
possible judicial selectivity of facts or issue selection, two common threats to judicial
independence described above.
51

Id. at 88.

52

Id. at 87.
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•

Religion was statistically significant, with Jewish judges being the most
favorable to LGBT litigants, Catholic judges least favorable, and
Protestants in the middle;53
• Age was important, as younger judges were more likely to render proequality decision; and54
• Political ideology played a major role, as federal judges appointed by
Democrats were significantly more receptive to the equality claims of
LGBT litigants than those appointed by Republicans.55
I have not been able to locate extensive empirical data on decisions involving LGBT
litigant since 2000, but based on my familiarity with many federal and state court
decisions rendered since then I would not predict any radical shifts in these findings.
D. Final Thoughts on Judicial Independence
A final critical issue that we address today is this: How does the public perceive
this complicated concept of judicial independence, especially in controversial cases
such as those involving LGBT rights? After months of reading and thinking about
judicial independence, I humbly offer the following perspective.
Judicial independence is widely embraced as a fundamental aspect of our
democracy. People who have never heard of the Federalist Papers (or maybe even of
Alexander Hamilton) understand its import. But after the general consensus that
judicial independence is a core value and must be protected, unanimity on the topic
crumbles.
The breakdown occurs due in large part to the lack of metrics to accurately
measure judicial independence in a given case. As a result, the public’s perception
of judicial independence has much in common with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
infamous definition of obscenity: “we know it when we see it,” or at least we think
we do.
So when we learn of a judicial decision with which we disagree, whether it is a
landmark LGBT rights case, a decision that declares that corporations are “citizens,”
or a case that effectively decides who will be our next president, our first reaction is
to impugn the integrity and motives of the judge or judges who rendered it. Any
decision that offends our political sensibilities and sense of justice results in our
attaching the dreaded “activist judge” label to its author(s).
Most people grumble about the decision for a few days and then go on about
their lives. Law professors prefer to write scathing law review articles about
decisions they disfavor, an expenditure of energy that likely has no influence
whatsoever on the judiciary’s decision-making process or the general public’s view
of it. But people who feel especially passionate about the decision may organize in a
manner that takes the concept of “activism” to a fevered pitch.
Similar to the fate that befell Hester Prynne of Scarlet Letter fame, political
strategists use modern media to symbolically attach a large red “A” on the “activist”
judges’ robes. They organize referendum campaigns to overturn judicial decisions—
for example, the Proposition 8 referendum in California that reversed the California
Supreme Court decision recognizing same-sex marriage. Political strategists
53

Id. at 88-91.

54

Id. at 91.

55

Id. at 114-15, 151-52.
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sometimes directly target the judges as well as their decisions. This, of course, is
what happened in Iowa following that court’s decision in Varnum v. Brien
recognizing same-sex marriage.56 And it is the reason we are here today. Is this
political backlash democracy in action that should be encouraged, or does it
undermine the very concept of judicial independence that it purports to protect?
I leave resolution of that question to our other speakers today. Ultimately,
however, that question will be answered by each of you and by other members of the
American public, as we individually and collectively decide whether or how to react
to judicial decisions with which we disagree.
III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN PERIL?
HON. MARSHA K. TERNUS
A. Introduction
Good afternoon. Thank you for asking me to participate in this discussion of
judicial independence and the impact of the politicization of judicial elections on that
core value of our society. These concepts,—judicial independence and the threat
posed by politicized judicial elections,—may sound like abstract principles, but they
are not abstract to me. I have lived them—or should I say, I have survived them.
As you now know, in the 2010 Iowa judicial retention election, voters removed
three justices from the Iowa Supreme Court after an unprecedented campaign against
them, funded by out-of-state special interest groups. The primary impetus for the
campaign against the justices was the Iowa Supreme Court’s unanimous decision
nineteen months earlier in Varnum v. Brien, declaring Iowa’s defense of marriage act
violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under the Iowa Constitution.57
B. Independent Judiciary
The events in Iowa provide a concrete context for our discussion of judicial
independence and the peril posed by politicized judicial elections. So this afternoon,
I would like to talk about the Varnum decision and its aftermath in the larger context
of the critical role of an independent judiciary in our democracy. Alexander
Hamilton said in the Federalist Papers that “[t]he complete independence of the
courts of justice” was “essential” in a constitution that limited legislative authority.58
Without the power of the courts to declare acts of the legislature contrary to the
constitution, he suggested, the “rights and privileges [reserved to the people] would
amount to nothing.”59 Hamilton also recognized that an independent judiciary was
necessary to guard the rights of individuals from the will of the majority, who may
wish to oppress a minority group in a manner incompatible with a constitutional
provision.60

56

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).

57

Id.

58

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002).

59

Id.

60

Id. at 428-29.
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These underpinnings of judicial independence were certainly tested in Iowa. The
stated purpose of the campaign against the justices was to send a message “in Iowa
and across the country” that judges ignore the will of the people at their peril,61—a
message of retaliation and intimidation utterly inconsistent with the concept of a
judiciary charged with the responsibility to uphold the constitutional rights of all
citizens.
Before we can really understand how destructive such a message is to our
democracy, it’s important to have a shared understanding of the foundation of our
system of justice. So let’s start there.
C. Rule of Law
As I’m sure the people in this room know, America’s system of justice is based
on the rule of law. The rule of law is a process of governing by laws that are applied
fairly and uniformly to all persons. Because the same rules are applied in the same
manner to everyone, the rule of law protects the civil, political, economic, and social
rights of all citizens, not just the rights of the most vociferous, the most organized,
the most popular, or the most powerful. Applying the rule of law is the sum and
substance of the work of the courts. So when we speak of “judicial independence,”
we are referring to a judiciary that is committed to the rule of law, independent of—
free of—outside influence, including personal bias or preference.
Iowa, like other states, created a government under the rule of law when its
citizens adopted a constitution that set forth the fundamental rules and principles that
would apply to citizens and their government. In fact, the Iowa Constitution
expressly states: “This constitution shall be the supreme law of the land,” and it
goes on to say that “any law inconsistent therewith, shall be void.”62
These constitutional provisions are given meaning by the courts because the
judicial branch is responsible for resolving disputes between citizens and their
government, including claims by citizens that the government has violated their
constitutional rights. Of course, the duty of courts to determine the constitutionality
of statutes does not mean the judicial power is superior to legislative power. Rather,
when the legislature has enacted a statute inconsistent with the will of the people as
expressed in their constitution, the courts must prefer the constitution over the
statutes. Thus, regardless of whether a particular result will be popular, courts must,
under all circumstances, protect the supremacy of the constitution by declaring an
unconstitutional statute void. Only by protecting the supremacy of the constitution
can citizens be assured that the freedoms and rights they included in their
constitution will be preserved. In this way, judicial review serves as an important
check on the legislative and executive branches, ensuring a proper balance of power
not only among the three branches of government but also between the people and
their government.
Of course, the people can always amend their constitution to ensure its content
and meaning reflect current public opinion. As Alexander Hamilton pointed out in
The Federalist, however, until the people have amended the constitution, “it is
binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption or
61

Bob Vander Plaats, Lawless Judges Deserve to Lose Jobs (August 26, 2010), available
at http://bobvp.w3bg.com/news/lawless_judges_deserve_to_lose_jobs_/.
62

Iowa Const. art. XII, § 1.
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even knowledge of [the people’s] sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a
departure from it.”63
With this background in mind, let’s turn to the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009
Varnum decision.
D. Varnum Decision
The events leading to this decision began when six same-sex couples applied for
Iowa marriage licenses. At that time and currently, Iowa’s marriage statute states:
“Marriage is a civil contract, requiring the consent of the parties capable of entering
into other contracts, except as herein otherwise provided.”64 One of the “except as
herein otherwise provided” provisions is Iowa’s version of the defense of marriage
act. It provides: “Only a marriage between a male and a female is valid.”65 Based
on this statute prohibiting civil contracts of marriage between persons of the same
gender, the county recorder refused to issue marriage licenses to the six same-sex
couples.
These twelve Iowans then filed a lawsuit asking that the court order the county
recorder to issue the requested licenses.66 They claimed the law limiting civil
contracts of marriage to one man and one woman was unconstitutional and
unenforceable.67 The constitutional provision upon which the couples relied in
Varnum was the equality clause Iowans included in their constitution when Iowa
became a state. It provides in relevant part: “[T]he general assembly shall not grant
to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges . . . which, upon the same terms shall not
equally belong to all citizens.”68
The Iowa Supreme Court held the state law limiting civil contracts of marriage to
one man and one woman violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Specifically,
the court determined the legislature’s restriction of the numerous privileges that flow
from civil marriage to a limited class of citizens violated the plaintiffs’ equality
rights under the Iowa Constitution.69 Because the Iowa Constitution expressly states
that any law inconsistent with the constitution is void, the supreme court declared the
offending statute void and granted the plaintiffs the relief they sought: an order that
the county recorder could not rely on the unconstitutional restriction on the persons
who could enter into civil contracts of marriage and was, therefore, obligated to issue
licenses to the six same-sex couples who brought the lawsuit.70
E. The Retention Election
Of course, the story does not end there. The second chapter involves Iowa’s
retention elections. Iowa has a commission-based, merit selection process for
63
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choosing judges known as the Missouri Plan. The process begins with a fifteenmember, nonpartisan commission that screens applicants for judicial office,
reviewing extensive information about each applicant’s background, education,
professional skills, and experience.71 After interviewing the applicants, the
commission submits the names of the three most highly qualified candidates to the
governor who is then required to pick the new judge from the commission’s
nominees.72
The other aspect of Iowa’s merit-selection process is retention elections. In a
retention election a judge runs unopposed and voters simply choose whether or not
to retain a judge for another term.73 Historically, politics had played no role in
judicial retention elections, and Iowa justices had not found it necessary to form
campaign committees, to engage in fundraising, or to campaign in any manner.
In the 2010 general election that followed the 2009 Varnum decision, three
members of the Iowa Supreme Court were on the ballot for retention. The 2010
retention elections were very different from previous elections. Because of our
participation in the Varnum decision, the justices on the ballot were targeted by a
Mississippi-based group, AFA Action, Inc.74 Persons supporting AFA’s campaign
against the justices claimed the Iowa Supreme Court had overstepped its
constitutional role “by declaring Iowa to be a ‘same-sex’ marriage state.”75 This
claim was not based on a critique of the court’s legal analysis. Not once did I hear
our opponents claim that we had misinterpreted the Iowa Constitution in finding the
defense of marriage act violated the plaintiffs’ equal protection rights. Rather, the
court was criticized for ignoring the will of the people and for ruling contrary to
God’s law. This latter criticism was particularly troubling because the court had
made an effort in the Varnum opinion to clarify the narrowness of its decision.
As I noted earlier, the law at issue in the Varnum case governed a legal contract,
not the religious institution of marriage. The court pointed out this distinction in its
opinion:
Our constitution does not permit any branch of government to resolve . . .
religious debates and entrusts to courts the task of ensuring government
avoids them. The statute at issue in this case does not prescribe a
definition of marriage for religious institutions. Instead, the statute
declares: “Marriage is a civil contract” and then regulates that civil
contract. Thus, in pursuing our task in this case, we proceed as civil
judges, far removed from the theological debate of religious clerics, and
focus only on the concept of civil marriage and the state licensing system
71
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that identifies a limited class of persons entitled to secular rights and
benefits associated with civil marriage.
....
As a result, civil marriage must be judged under our constitutional
standards of equal protection and not under religious doctrines or the
religious views of individuals.76
After holding Iowa’s constitution required that the state accord the same marital
status and benefits to both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, the court pointed out
that “religious doctrine and views contrary to this [holding] are unaffected,” and “[a]
religious denomination can still define marriage as a union between a man and a
woman.”77
Notwithstanding the fact that the court’s ruling did not affect religious beliefs or
practices, substantial opposition to the justices’ retention came from individuals and
groups who believed the court had violated God’s law or natural law.78 For example,
through an effort called Project Jeremiah, preachers were urged to use their pulpits to
advocate for a no vote on retention of the justices, which many did.79 In fact, one
leader of the campaign against retention declared after the election, Iowa voters had
done “God’s will by standing up to the three judges who would try to redefine God’s
institution.”80 One has to wonder if the persons campaigning against us even read
the decision because, as I have pointed out, the court expressly avoided redefining
the religious institution of marriage.
But the campaign against the justices was about more than same-sex marriage. It
became an assault on the power of the court itself. As I have already mentioned, the
main leader of the campaign against the justices was a Mississippi group affiliated
with the American Family Association. AFA called its Iowa program, Iowa For
Freedom.81 This group’s local spokesperson argued, “appointed judges [are]
dictating from the bench which societal beliefs are acceptable and which ones are
not.”82 He claimed the retention election was not about gay marriage; it was about
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liberty.83 Asserting the court “legislated from the bench,” he said, “If they will do
this for marriage, all your liberties are up for grabs.”84 In a television ad sponsored
by Iowa for Freedom, the National Organization for Marriage, and the Campaign for
Working Families, the narrator told viewers “If they can redefine marriage, none of
the freedoms we hold dear are safe from judicial activism.”85
I probably do not need to tell this audience that the Iowa Supreme Court took
away no one’s liberties or freedoms in the Varnum decision. To the contrary, the
civil rights of same-sex couples to the secular benefits that flow from the civil
contract of marriage were upheld. Moreover, the views of individuals and religious
institutions were unaffected by this decision and their religious freedom to define the
religious institution of marriage as only between one man and one woman was
expressly preserved.
You might be wondering: What was the response to these inaccurate and
demonizing attacks on the judiciary? As for the justices themselves, we decided
early on not to form campaign committees and not to engage in any fundraising.
This decision reflected our collective view of our role as judges. Judges must be fair
and impartial. They cannot be obligated to campaign contributors and just as
importantly, they should not be perceived as beholden to campaign contributors. We
strongly believed our role as fair and impartial members of the Iowa Supreme Court
would have been forever tarnished had we engaged in fundraising and campaigning.
We decided we would not contribute to the politicization of the judiciary in Iowa
even though we knew this decision might cost us our jobs. Our hope was that the
bar association and others would come to our aid. They did, but not with the vigor
and money that was required to counteract the emotionally laden and factually
inaccurate television ads that ran incessantly for the three months prior to the
election.
F. Threat to an Independent Judiciary
Dealing with controversial issues has always been part of being a judge, and
certainly, public debate about the merits of court decisions is a healthy aspect of a
democratic society. But what message is sent when a retention election is used as a
referendum on a particular court decision? What message is sent when it is used to
intimidate judges who in the future will be called upon to make politically unpopular
decisions?
Opponents of the Varnum decision argued judges must be held accountable to the
people when the court makes a decision the people do not like. But the message they
were really sending was that judges should rule in accordance with public opinion
83
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even when that means ignoring the constitution. I read an article by a Minnesota
judge who responded to similar contentions with this observation:
It might sound good to have judges “accountable to the people.” But
which people? Should judges be accountable to those who shout the
loudest or make the most threats? Should judges be accountable to the
majority? If so, what happens to the rights of the minority? And what
happens to a judge’s responsibility to uphold the law and the
Constitution? When a judge starts to worry about who [the judge] will
please or displease with a ruling, then we cease to be a government based
on law.86
Just consider the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.87 If public opinion were the standard by which judges should make
decisions, that case would probably have had a different outcome. The court’s
decision in Brown was unpopular with many, many people at the time, yet that
decision is now universally respected. As former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has
observed, the Brown decision was “an exercise in accountability to the Rule of Law
over the popular will.”88
I think the Varnum decision was as well. I can assure you the members of our
court were very much aware when we issued our decision in Varnum that it would
unleash a wave of criticism, and we knew we could possibly lose our jobs because of
our vote in that case. Nonetheless, we remained true to our oath of office in which
we promised to uphold the Iowa Constitution without fear, favor or hope of reward.89
It should come as no surprise that judges are most at risk when they uphold the
rights of politically unpopular minorities against the wishes of the majority. As
Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist, “It is of great importance in a republic
not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”90 The founding fathers
recognized that an independent judiciary was of critical importance in safeguarding
the rights of all parts of society. Hamilton made the realistic observation that, in
such situations, “it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to
do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution.”91
The fortitude of many judges will be tested in the coming years. The groups who
were successful in Iowa have vowed they will not stop with the removal of three
justices from the Iowa Supreme Court.92 Moreover, the opposition to same-sex
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marriage that drove the anti-retention efforts in Iowa is only one aspect of a larger
movement to meld the religious views of evangelical Christians into the fabric of our
government and our laws. In fact, earlier this year over 400 Iowa ministers attended
an expense-paid, two-day Pastors’ Policy Briefing in West Des Moines, Iowa where
they heard from Newt Gingrich, Haley Barbour, Michele Bachmann, and Mike
Huckabee, all possible 2012 presidential contenders at the time.93 Huckabee told the
crowd, “We face a spiritual war in this country.”94 According to a New York Times
article, “[t]he audience heard how to push their flocks to register and vote along
‘biblical principles.’”95 This effort continues tomorrow night when five presidential
candidates will appear at a presidential candidate forum in Des Moines sponsored by
the Iowa Faith & Freedom Coalition, a conservative Christian group that opposes
LGBT rights.96
By using these examples, I don’t mean to single out evangelical Christians.
Groups interested in social issues are not the only ones that might benefit from a
politicized judiciary. All one has to do is examine the facts culminating in the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.97 to
realize that individuals and corporations contributing to judicial campaigns also hope
to influence the candidate’s judicial decision making. In that case, the president of
Massey Coal Company contributed over $3 million to elect Brent Benjamin to the
West Virginia Supreme Court.98 After his election, Justice Benjamin refused to
recuse himself from an appeal that had been filed by the coal company.99 So all five
justices on the West Virginia Supreme Court participated in the appeal, and they
reversed a fifty million dollar judgment against the coal company on a vote of 3-2.100
I have no doubt that the groups that were active in the 2010 Iowa retention
election as well as other special interest groups will be emboldened by the events in
Iowa and seek to intimidate and influence judges by the threat of removal from
office. My fear is that efforts to intimidate the judiciary will, over time, destroy the
ability and willingness of judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the
Constitution or will result in the election or selection only of judges who agree to
adhere to a certain agenda.
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I hope we never reach the point in this country that judges become no more than
politicians in robes, deciding cases in accordance with public opinion polls or based
on what will satisfy their campaign contributors. And I greatly fear the current effort
to transform judges into theologians in robes, ignoring the rule of law in favor of
Biblical guidance. If the day comes that judges make decisions as politicians or
theologians, this society and our democracy are in serious trouble. Only an
independent judiciary can ensure that the minority is protected from the tyranny of
the majority. Only an independent judiciary committed to the rule of law can
safeguard every citizen’s liberties and rights.
Politicized judicial elections undermine judicial independence, make no mistake
about it. Over time this trend will result in a judiciary that is less and less likely to
be fair and impartial. Why?
First, there is the real and perceived corrupting influence of campaign
fundraising. Do we really believe that special interest groups and corporations who
support a judicial candidate do not expect that person, once elected, to vote a certain
way on certain issues? Of course, they do. And that expectation will not be lost on
some judges. Second, aside from the fundraising aspect of politicized judicial
elections, threats of retaliation and intimidation will be understood by sitting judges.
Sadly, some judges will be discouraged from following the rule of law when to do so
will lead to an unpopular outcome. As Justice O’Connor has said: “The law
sometimes demands unpopular outcomes, and a judge who is forced to weigh what is
popular rather than focusing solely on what the law demands has lost some . . . .
impartiality.”101
Ironically, politicized judicial elections undermine our democracy even when
judges elected or retained in such elections adhere to the rule of law. Even if judges
have the courage to disappoint their campaign contributors or ignore the threats of
special interest groups, fundraising and campaigning by judges blur the distinction
between judges and politicians. When judges are viewed by citizens as politicians,
as susceptible to influence, confidence in the courts is undermined, and the integrity
and validity of court decisions become suspect.
I’m not being alarmist. I have seen first hand the impact of politicized elections
on the court as an institution. Let me give you an example. I was on the Iowa
Supreme Court for seventeen years, and I had never heard the integrity of our court
or the motivation for our decisions questioned, directly or indirectly. But in the two
months after the 2010 retention election that I served before my term expired, I
witnessed two incidents that showed me the view of our court had been changed
forever. In two different cases, attorneys challenged orders the Supreme Court had
entered, claiming in very direct terms that our orders in those cases were politically
motivated. Never had I seen such claims in pleadings or otherwise in seventeen
years on the court, but I saw two in the two months I served after the election.
So whether we are talking about the actual corrupting influence of campaign
contributions and judicial intimidation or simply the perception that the judiciary can
be influenced, politicized judicial elections pose serious risks to our democracy. Our
government can only function as it was intended to function if the checks and
balances envisioned by our founding fathers are preserved. One of those checks and
balances is the duty of courts to declare laws inconsistent with the constitution void.
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Clearly, the principles and rights enshrined in our federal and state constitutions will
be preserved and given meaning only if they are supported and enforced by a fair,
impartial and independent judiciary. But more is required. Court decisions find
their legitimacy in the willingness of the other branches of government and our
citizens to abide by those decisions. Can that legitimacy be sustained, however, if
court decisions are perceived to have no integrity?
G. Conclusion
At the end of the day, the debate about controversial court decisions and the
judges who make them boils down to a simple question: What kind of court system
do Americans want? A court system that issues rulings based upon public opinion
polls, campaign contributions, and political intimidation or a court system that issues
impartial rulings based upon the rule of law? If we as Americans want our
freedoms, liberties and rights protected by a fair and impartial judiciary, we must
support the courts even when the rights they uphold are not our own, but those of a
politically unpopular minority.
A former dean of the Yale Law School, Robert Maynard Hutchins, once warned:
The level of understanding, or rather lack of understanding, of basic civics
is an actual threat to the future stability of the Republic. If our nation’s
populace does not understand the role of the three coequal branches of
their government, then it will not be long before the future stability of the
foundation for that government will be susceptible to becoming
irrevocably compromised.102
He continues with this forewarning, “It has been stated that the death of
democracy is not likely to be an assassination from ambush. It will be a slow
extinction from apathy, indifference, and undernourishment.”103 I agree with Dean
Hutchins and think that what happened in Iowa is a sad step in that direction.
It’s very easy to take what we have in America for granted, especially when we
learn of the tyrannical regimes in other parts of the world. But Dean Hutchins’
underlying message is correct: America is not immune from disintegration. There is
no guarantee that our children and grandchildren will enjoy the fair and impartial
justice we have enjoyed. Our children and grandchildren will only know true justice
if we fight to preserve it. It is the responsibility of everyone in this room to support
and advocate for a judiciary with integrity, one free from the political influence and
intimidation of special interest groups and campaign contributors. Only if citizens
have an unwavering commitment to an independent judiciary can we assure future
generations that they too will enjoy a society governed by the rule of law and not by
the tyranny of the majority.
Thank you so much for having me here today.
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IV. BULLYING THE BENCH
CAMILLA B. TAYLOR104
In the last decade, the marriage equality movement has transformed itself from a
wishful rallying cry of an oppressed few into a mainstream movement whose time
has come. Indeed, for many young people, the struggle for the freedom to marry has
become the civil rights struggle of a generation. A May 2011 Gallup poll for the
first time documented majority public support for same-sex couples’ freedom to
marry.105 Among eighteen to thirty-four year-olds, who will be the future majorityvoting block, support for marriage equality is now at 70%.
These developments in public opinion reflect changes in positive law. As of
October 2011, six states and the District of Columbia permit same-sex couples to
marry. A federal trial court ruled that so-called “Proposition 8,” a ballot measure
that stripped the freedom to marry from Californians by a small voter margin in
2008, is unconstitutional. Marriage legislation is likely to move forward this year in
several states. Eight states provide same-sex couples and their children access to a
comprehensive lesser legal status for family recognition (such as “civil unions” or
“domestic partnerships”), through which these states make available the majority of
the state law protections, responsibilities, and benefits of marriage. Still, more states
offer a more limited menu of protections to same-sex couples as well. Court
challenges to the federal so-called “Defense of Marriage Act,” which denies federal
respect to marriages of same-sex couples, move forward in several federal circuits,
and the Obama administration has determined that the law is indefensible and
unconstitutional, leaving defense of the law up to Republican leadership in
Congress.
However, these advances for lesbian and gay couples and their children have not
come easily. Opponents of marriage equality have fought back with varying tactics
and varying degrees of success. For example, antigay groups have used ballot
measures to insert exclusionary provisions in the constitutions of twenty-nine states.
Antigay groups also have fought to exempt their supporters from generally
applicable laws requiring disclosure of donors and petition-signers, although these
efforts have been unsuccessful to date.106 Worse, they have attacked the impartiality
of the courts, targeting individual jurists who have ruled that excluding same-sex
couples and their children from marriage deprives these families of constitutional
guarantees of liberty and equality. Time will tell, but this last tactic is the one that
may have the most lasting and destructive impact on our system of justice, our
societal understanding of the equality guarantee, and indeed, on our constitutional
democracy itself.
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A. Reaction to Varnum v. Brien
On November 2, 2010, the marriage equality movement suffered a blow. Wellfunded antigay groups succeeded in ousting from office three well-respected Iowa
Supreme Court justices who were up for what should have been routine retention
elections. These groups targeted the justices because they had joined in a 2009
unanimous opinion in Lambda Legal’s lawsuit, Varnum v. Brien,107 which struck
down Iowa’s marriage ban and ordered marriage licenses issued to same-sex
couples.
Led by American Family Association, the antigay groups included the Family
Research Council, the Alliance Defense Fund, the Faith and Freedom Coalition and
the National Organization for Marriage.108 Together they poured more than one
million dollars into a campaign, culminating in a twenty-city bus tour, urging Iowa
voters to kick the justices off the Court.109 Supporters of the justices amassed only a
small fraction of that sum. The justices themselves declined to fund raise or
campaign on their own behalf, deeming it unseemly for sitting judges to create an
appearance of pandering for votes.110
The justices lost by a vote of 54 percent to 45 percent.
Antigay groups’ decision to target Iowa’s justices was designed to intimidate
judges in Iowa and across the nation, and to bully lesbian and gay people into being
fearful of bringing discrimination claims to court. However, the loss of these
justices had no impact on Iowa’s substantive law, including the right to marry for
lesbian and gay couples. The Court’s ruling in Varnum is still the law of the land,
and the right to marry remains enshrined in the Iowa Constitution. Thousands of
same-sex couples have already married in Iowa, and more couples marry every day.
Opponents of equality for gay and lesbian couples chose to attack Iowa’s justices
precisely because they knew that they were unlikely ever to be able to roll back
marriage equality. When the unanimous high court decision in Varnum came down
in April 2009, the Iowa Senate Majority Leader, Mike Gronstal, and then-House
Speaker Pat Murphy vowed to oppose calls to amend Iowa’s constitution to preclude
gay and lesbian couples from marrying. Gronstal and Murphy issued a joint
statement heralding the decision as a victory for civil rights, stating that “‘When all
is said and done, we believe the only lasting question about today’s events will be
why it took us so long.’”111 Then-governor Chet Culver also opposed amending
Iowa’s constitution. More than one public opinion poll in Iowa conducted since the
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decision demonstrates that a majority of Iowans do not want a constitutional
amendment, and a recent poll now demonstrates majority support for lesbian and gay
couples’ right to marry.112
While the 2010 election results diminished the number of political officeholders
who support equality, a constitutional amendment still appears unlikely. Amending
the Iowa Constitution requires a vote in both chambers of the legislature in two
consecutive two-year general assemblies. The earliest this could happen is 2014.
Then the amendment could go to the public for a vote. However, although current
Governor Terry Branstad, who assumed the governorship last year after a twelveyear hiatus, supports an amendment, and Pat Murphy has lost his majority in the
Iowa House, Mike Gronstal remains the senate majority leader, and he continues to
state in no uncertain terms that his commitment to prevent a constitutional
amendment remains firm, no matter the pressure. “The easy political thing for me to
do years ago would have been to say, ‘Oh, let’s let this thing go. It’s just too
political and too messy,’” Gronstal said. “What’s ugly is giving up what you believe
in, that everybody has the same rights. Giving up on that? That’s ugly.”113
However, even though the retention vote failed to change the law, the vote
nevertheless was “a body blow to the principle of an independent judiciary insulated
from popular sentiment,” as Iowa’s largest newspaper, the Des Moines Register,
editorialized shortly after the election.114 An Iowa judge stands for retention every
eight years. Retention elections are usually unremarkable, and intended not to
provide a referendum on individual court decisions but to allow voters a say about
the overall competence of judges or specific instances of corruption, neither of which
was even an issue in this election. Since 1962, when the current system was
adopted, no Iowa Supreme Court justice ever has lost a retention election.115
Attacking justices for participation in one decision, no matter how unpopular,
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the courts, and constitutes a
misuse of the retention process. As the Iowa Courts website states:
Although it may be appropriate for politicians to consider public opinion and the
views of special interest groups when drafting laws and regulations, it is never
appropriate for judges to do so when deciding cases. Judges must remain impartial.
In this respect, the judiciary is very different from the other two branches of
government. Judges are accountable to the Constitution and the law—not political
pressure.116
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B. Civil Rights Decisions in Iowa
Iowa’s judiciary has a long proud history of independence and leadership on civil
rights issues. As the New York Times noted, “[f]rom its first decision in 1839, the
Iowa Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to push ahead of public opinion on
matters of minority rights, ruling against slavery, school segregation and
discrimination decades before the national mood shifted toward racial equality.”117
In 1839, when the Iowa Supreme Court comprised only three members, Chief
Justice Charles Mason authored the Court’s first published opinion in In re Ralph.118
A Missouri slave owner had sued for the return of Ralph, a man whom the
Missourian had permitted to come to Iowa to work toward the purchase of his
freedom. When Ralph failed to come up with sufficient money, the Missourian sent
bounty hunters to collect him and sued in Iowa court for his return. Twenty-six
years before ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, an Iowa court rejected the
Missourian’s claim. Chief Justice Mason wrote, “no man in this territory can be
reduced to slavery.”119 The decision stands in sharp contrast to the infamous Dred
Scott decision eighteen years later, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that even
in free states, slaves had no legal claim to freedom.
Thirty years after In re Ralph, and nearly a century before Brown v. Board of
Education, Iowa Justice Chester Cole authored a decision desegregating Iowa’s
schools, rejecting a “separate but equal” system of public education for African
American children. In Clark v. Board of Directors,120 Susan B. Clark, a twelve-yearold African American girl, brought suit after a public school denied her admission
because of her race. Justice Cole acknowledged that “public sentiment” opposed
“the intermingling of white and colored children.”121 Nevertheless, he held that a
local school board had no authority to deny African American children the right to
equal education on that ground. To bend to discriminatory majoritarian impulses in
such a way would “sanction a plain violation of the spirit of our laws,” he stated.
In addition to trailblazing on racial justice issues, the Iowa Supreme Court led the
way in numerous instances involving women’s rights. Iowa courts were the first in
the nation to admit a woman to the practice of law.122 In 1869, Arabella Mansfield
became the first woman in the United States admitted to the bar in any state—three
years before the U.S. Supreme Court determined that an Illinois woman had no right
to practice law. The Iowa high court also was one of the first to establish that the
Nineteenth Amendment, in extending to women the right to vote, made women
eligible for jury service.
The Iowa Supreme Court’s protection of minorities extended to religious groups
as well. In the early years of the twentieth century, the Court fought back against
state government’s attack on the corporate existence of the Amana Society, a
117
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religious settlement whose members believed in the communal ownership of
property. The Court held that the state’s corporate laws were restrained by the
Society’s members’ right to religious freedom: “Each individual must determine for
himself what limit he shall place upon his aspirations. . . . Under the blessings of free
government, every citizen should be permitted to pursue that mode of life which is
dictated by his own conscience . . . .”123
C. Iowa Allows Same-Sex Marriage
Lambda Legal relied on the Iowa Supreme Court’s extraordinary history of
prescience and integrity when we filed our lawsuit on behalf of six same-sex couples
seeking to marry in their home state of Iowa in December 2005. At the time that we
filed, only one state in the country—Massachusetts—permitted same-sex couples to
marry. Many commentators around the nation who were less familiar with Iowa’s
proud tradition of leadership on matters involving equality and liberty questioned
why we would file a marriage equality lawsuit in the heartland when states on the
coasts had not yet embraced it. However, we had faith that we would get a fair
hearing.
We were right. A Polk County trial court struck down the marriage ban in August
2007. After Polk County appealed, the case went directly to the Iowa Supreme
Court.
Iowa became the third state, after Massachusetts and Connecticut, in which
same-sex couples could marry, followed quickly thereafter by Vermont, New
Hampshire, New York, and the District of Columbia. (More than eighteen thousand
couples had validly married in California, as well, before the enactment of
Proposition 8 prevented further couples from marrying in that state, and Maine
briefly enacted marriage equality through legislation before a referendum prevented
it from going into effect.) The decision was the first unanimous high court opinion
on marriage for same-sex couples. The Court spoke in plain language, explaining
that the six Iowa couples and their children had been denied basic freedoms and
security guaranteed to all Iowans on equal terms.
The Varnum justices were aware that their opinion might not enjoy majority
support, but it was the only decision they could take; they had taken oaths to uphold
the Iowa Constitution’s promise of equality and it was up to them to breathe new life
into it, as the Court had done so many times in generations past. At both oral
argument and in the written opinion in the case the Court diligently explained the
legal review process and the role of the Court to the public:
Our responsibility . . . is to protect constitutional rights of individuals
from legislative enactments that have denied those rights, even when the
rights have not yet been broadly accepted, were at one time unimagined,
or challenge a deeply ingrained practice or law viewed to be impervious
to the passage of time.124
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D. The Justices of the Varnum Court
The three unseated Iowa justices were a bipartisan group unfairly characterized
as “activist.” The Varnum Court comprised both Democratic and Republican
appointees. Justice Mark Cady, who authored the opinion, is often described as one
of the more conservative members of the Court, and was appointed by former (and
incoming) Republican governor Terry Branstad. The three unseated justices—Chief
Justice Marsha Ternus, Justice Michael Streit, and Justice David Baker—were
skilled jurists and native Iowans known more for their long years of respected
service on the bench than for adherence to any particular ideology.
Chief Justice Ternus grew up on a farm in northern Iowa, attending Drake and
the University of Iowa. Republican governor Branstad appointed her to Iowa’s
Supreme Court in 1993, and her fellow members of the Court elected her as chief
justice in 2006. She is the first woman to serve as chief justice of Iowa’s highest
court. As chief, she made her highest priority the improvement of court oversight
for children caught in the court system, chairing the State Childrens’ Justice Council.
In 2009, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Roberts appointed
her to the national Judicial Conference Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction.
Married with three children, she and her family attended a Catholic church in West
Des Moines.
Justice Streit was born and raised in Sheldon, Iowa. Governor Branstad
appointed him as a district court judge in 1983, and later to the Iowa Court of
Appeals in 1996, before Streit was appointed to the high court in 2001. He chaired
the Judges Association Education Committee and speaks frequently before Rotary
Clubs, churches, Jaycees, Kiwanis, and Boy Scout groups.
Justice Baker, the most recent appointee to the Iowa Supreme Court in 2008 after
serving both as a district court and appellate judge, was born in Muscatine, Iowa,
grew up in Waterloo, and went to college and law school at the University of Iowa.
He participated in writing Iowa’s Appellate Practice Manual and served on Iowa’s
Ethics and Grievance Committee. Past president of the Cedar Rapids West Rotary
Club and a board member of the United Way, he proudly noted in his web biography
his participation in the creation of a local bike trail and duties as a volunteer swim
coach at the YMCA.
Although profiles in courage, these justices hardly stood out as candidates for the
label “activist.” However, the out-of-state extremist organizations that targeted them
had no concern for truth. Their aim was to paint the justices as “robed masters and
judicial activists imposing their will on the rest of us.”125
E. Reaction
The retention elections shine light on antigay extremist organizations’ agenda to
undermine the system of checks and balances that has served us well for over two
hundred years. Since the election, opponents of equality for gay and lesbian couples
have exulted in the ouster of the three justices. “‘Taking on the judicial class,’” Newt
Gingrich reportedly said to supporters, “and telling judges that ‘we are not going to
tolerate enforced secularization of our country,’ is ‘one of the most important things
125
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we can engage in.’”126 David Barton, a Texas antigay activist, crowed, “‘[t]his is
what we call hanging a bloody scalp on the gallery rail.’”127 The National
Organization for Marriage has already said that it intends to target Iowa retention
elections in 2012 and 2016.
The targeting of the Iowa justices was not just an attack on three skilled jurists,
or on the outcome of one case—it was an attack on the constitutional equality
guarantee itself. The constitutional guarantee of equality is inherently a countermajoritarian principle. If the right to equal protection means anything, it means that
courts are empowered to strike down a piece of legislation—regardless of whether it
enjoys majority support—when that legislation targets a minority for unequal
treatment. Indeed, it is the absolute obligation of a court to do so. If a slim majority
can unseat a court solely for upholding the rights of a minority against majority
attack, then what is the point of a constitutional guarantee of equality at all?
Political attacks on the judiciary for courts’ commitment to equality are nothing
new. In 1954, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Brown vs. Board of Education
that state-mandated segregation in public schools violated the U.S. Constitution,
some cried that the Court had overstepped its role and usurped power from the
legislature. Billboards to “Impeach Earl Warren” littered the South.128 If Iowa Chief
Justice Charles Mason had faced a retention vote after In re Ralph in 1839, or Justice
Chester Cole had done so after Clark v. Board of Education, they likely would have
had difficulty retaining their seats, too. Fortunately for these jurists, now widely
admired as heroes, they were not subject to a politicized retention election process.
The founders of our nation understood in structuring our federal judiciary that if
courts are not insulated from voters who disagree with particular decisions, then
majorities will have the power to strip fundamental rights away from minorities—
and our cherished principles of liberty and freedom will disappear.
As retired United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has noted,
our judicial system will fail to work if litigants become concerned that a
[J]udge is more accountable to a campaign contributor or an ideological
group than to the law. In our system, the judiciary, unlike the legislative
and the executive branches, is supposed to answer only to the law and the
Constitution. Courts are supposed to be the one safe place where every
citizen can receive a fair hearing.129
A judge who is forced to weigh what is popular rather than focusing solely on
what the law demands loses independence and impartiality. If an embattled judiciary
were to lose its ability to protect our laws and constitution with impartiality, that
would be a tragic loss for our country. “‘Judges have to be assured,’ Justice
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O’Connor said, that ‘they’re not going to be subject to political retaliation for their
judicial acts.’”130
Newly empowered antigay groups also will lobby heavily the Republican Iowa
house and governor to insist upon passage of a constitutional amendment. Iowa
Senate Majority Leader Mike Gronstal will face great pressure in the coming years
from those who would put a constitutional amendment on the ballot.
Nevertheless, we have reason to be hopeful. Numerous Iowans expressed shock
and heartbreak upon learning of the justices’ defeat. The Des Moines Register’s
editorial board condemned the retention vote as a “black mark on Iowa history.”
Many equality advocates had been complacent about the justices’ retention prospects
and underestimated the impact of a million dollar campaign waged from out of state.
(In a previous election in 2006, when Iowa antigay activists had targeted a trial judge
up for retention in a conservative county because the judge had granted two lesbian
women’s request for a dissolution from their civil union, the judge had survived with
little difficulty.) Cedar Rapids Gazette columnist Todd Dorman wrote on November
3 that history may “recall this as the moment when fair-minded Iowans who support
equality for all under the law finally realized that they’ve got a fight on their hands.
And they decided to do something about it.”131 He also cautioned against
underestimating the level of support in Iowa for marriage rights for same-sex
couples, as voters’ personal investment in three judges keeping their jobs cannot be
equated with voters’ commitment to the continued right to marry for same-sex
couples and the guarantee of equality precious to all Iowans. As the Dubuque
Telegraph Herald noted, “the number of Iowans who actually wanted the three
justices removed because of the same-sex marriage ruling might be somewhat
overstated [by the results of the retention election]. In a normal year when judges
and justices are on the ballot, some 30 percent typically vote ‘no,’ even when there
are no apparent issues.”
Iowa’s loss of three skilled and experienced jurists was a wake-up call for all of
us. It is the responsibility of every voter to protect the system of checks and balances
that defines our democracy. We must make sure that the next time extremists target
jurists for deciding cases with integrity, we are more prepared to take on the fight.
Here at Lambda Legal, it continues to be our responsibility to make our case for
equality, not just before judges, but in the court of public opinion. We cannot allow
bullies to intimidate us. We must continue to bring cases on behalf of people who
have been wronged, and we have faith that the courts remain a refuge for lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender people, and people with HIV who have suffered
discrimination and been deprived basic freedoms. But we must do more than win in
court; we must win hearts and minds and educate the public on how our
constitutional democracy is supposed to work. The members of the Varnum Court
took an oath to defend the Iowa Constitution and earned their place in history when
they lived up to it with integrity. It is up to the rest of us to vindicate them by
creating a world in which equality is so embraced and celebrated that the portraits of
130
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Chief Justice Ternus, Justice Streit, and Justice Baker hang proudly next to Justice
Mason’s and Justice Cole’s in the Court’s rotunda—in a pantheon of Iowa heroes
who did the right thing before much of the rest of the country was ready. We have
some work to do to get to that day. But we firmly believe we will see it.
V. A TOXIC BREW: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE AGE OF BIG-MONEY POLITICS
DANIEL P. TOKAJI∗
A. Introduction
For those who care about judicial independence, Iowa’s 2010 election is a major
wake-up call. Three sitting justices of the state supreme court were denied retention
by the statewide electorate as a direct result of their decision in Varnum v. Brien,132
upholding the right of same-sex couples to marry. There can be little doubt that this
chain of events will make judges in controversial cases think twice before issuing
decisions in support of an unpopular person or group. The events in Iowa will be in
the back of their minds, if not in front. For those like me who think that one of the
most important roles of our courts is to protect the rights of everyone, including
those who are unpopular with the majority of the citizenry, this is a deeply troubling
prospect. Even if we view the result in Iowa’s retention election as an isolated
incident, it is worrisome. Though I’ve never heard any judge admit that the
imperative to attract votes or campaign money affects their decisionmaking, state
judges cannot help but be aware of what happened in Iowa.
It would be bad enough that judicial independence is threatened by the prospect
of state judges standing before an angry electorate to defend an unpopular decision.
But it actually gets even worse. And it’s this “worse” part that I am going to focus
on in my remarks today. It is even worse because of the combined effect of two
developments. The first is the high degree of political polarization that presently
exists, a phenomenon exemplified in the campaign over judicial retention in Iowa.
The second is the rise and intensification of big-money politics. These two elements
have together created a toxic brew. These developments are not only harmful to
judicial independence, but also threaten to move us even further toward a judicial
system that caters to the interests of wealthy individuals and corporations, while
ignoring the needs of ordinary citizens, especially those at the bottom of the
socioeconomic ladder. In sum, we face the risk of a judicial system that even more
closely resembles our current pay-to-play political system. They present reason to
be concerned that what’s happened in Iowa is a harbinger of things to come,
portending serious problems for the majority of states that have judicial elections.
My remarks today proceed as follows. After very briefly reviewing the history
of judicial elections, I discuss two megatrends: the polarization and monetization of
politics. I then address the impact they can be expected to have—and may already
be having—on state judiciaries. I conclude by talking about what might be done.
∗
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B. History
The best place to start is with the United States Constitution. Article III provides
that judges both of the Supreme Court and inferior courts shall hold their offices
during good behavior. This provides the federal judiciary with independence—
insulation from the shifting winds of public opinion—and therefore the capacity to
protect unpopular individuals and groups against the tyranny of the majority. The
Framers recognized that the judiciary would serve an important counter-majoritarian
function in our Republic by protecting minorities. They weren’t thinking of gays
and lesbians, but Article III was designed to ensure that federal judges wouldn’t be
swayed by negative public opinion when hearing the claims of unpopular or
vulnerable groups.
States followed suit at the beginning of the Republic. Until 1845, every state that
entered the union had an appointed judiciary.133 But in a very short period of time,
largely as result of Jacksonian democracy and the spirit that it brought with it, things
changed. The states that were admitted in the twenty years after 1845 elected their
judiciaries so that by 1865, twenty-four of the thirty-four states had judicial
elections.134
At the beginning of the twentieth century, some academics and lawyers raised
questions about the system of electing judges.135 There was concern much like that
which we have heard today, about the politicization of the judiciary. As a result,
starting in the early 1900s, states made some changes. A number of them, twelve by
1927, had switched to nonpartisan elections.136 But many people realized that this
step wasn’t enough to protect the independence of state court judges, and so
Missouri in 1940 adopted a system that is widely used still today: merit-based
selection of judges followed by unopposed but regular retention elections.137 In the
decades that followed, a number of states moved to the Missouri plan which strikes
something of a balance between on the one hand insuring independence, while on
the other hand providing some degree of accountability.
While the above presents an exceedingly brief summary of a long and
complicated history,138 even this limited context should suffice to demonstrate that
the current controversy over judicial elections is nothing new. And the central
question has not much changed over the course of this history: Do we want greater
independence or do we want greater accountability? In the remarks that follow, I
argue that even if you are someone who falls more on the accountability side of the
spectrum, there are reasons to be very worried about our current system, including
not only the direct election of judges but also retention elections.
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Today, 89% of state judges must stand for election.139 For state high courts, nine
states elect judges through partisan elections, another thirteen through nonpartisan
elections, while judges are appointed as an initial matter in the remaining twentyeight states.140 Twenty states have some form of retention elections for their state
high court judges (six partisan and fourteen nonpartisan).141 In recent decades we
have seen more contested elections. Between 1990 and 2000 the percentage of
contested elections increased from 44% to 75%.142 We have also seen an increase in
the rate at which incumbents as in Iowa are losing elections. The incumbent loss
rate doubled going from 4% to 8% between 1980 and 2000.143
C. Iowa
Most worrisome are the cases, uncommon though they may be, in which justices
are not retained. The most notable recent example is the focal point of this
conference. In 2010, three Iowa Supreme Court Justices, Michael Streit, David
Baker, and Chief Justice Marsha Ternus, were ousted. There was just one issue
behind their ouster—their decision in Varnum striking down the ban on same-sex
marriage. The aspect of judicial elections on which I’ll focus is the money spent in
these elections.
Almost one million dollars was spent against the Iowa justices.144 Over $900,000
of that amount came from out-of-state groups that were ideologically opposed to the
decision: the National Organization for Marriage based in Washington, D.C.; the
American Family Association’s AFA Action, Inc. of Tupelo, Mississippi; and the
Campaign for Working Families PAC of Arlington, Virginia.145 By comparison, just
over $424,000 was spent in support of the justices,146 which means that opponents of
retention outspent supporters by more than a two-to-one margin. Now one million
dollars may sound like a lot, but it’s significantly less than the average winner spent
on U.S. House races in 2010.147 But for reasons I explain below, this may be just the
tip of the iceberg when it comes to spending to judicial elections.
At the same time, we shouldn’t exaggerate the frequency with which this type of
event occurs. The closest historical parallel to Iowa’s 2010 retention election is
something that happened in my home state of California twenty-five years ago. In
139

Daniel Betts, How High is Too High?: Judicial Elections and Recusal after Caperton,
15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 247, 255 (2010).
140

Kang & Shepherd, supra note 133, at 79.
breakdown. Id. at 80-81.
141

Id. at 79.

142

Id. at 81.

143

Id. at 82.

The authors provide a state-by-state

144

See Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or
Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 120-21 (2011).
145

Id. at 121.

146

Id.

147

See Election Stats, 2010, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/
elec_stats.php?cycle=2010 (last visited March 19, 2012) (average winner in U.S. House spent
over $1.4 million).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

39

500

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:461

1986, three California Supreme Court Justices, Joseph Grodin, Cruz Reynoso, and
Rose Bird, were ousted by voters. Again, a single issue that was at least mainly
responsible for their ouster. Specifically, the issue that drove the ouster was that
these justices overturned death sentences at a time when the death penalty was very
popular in California.148 There were other criminal justice issues on the table, but the
death penalty was the issue on which the electorate was principally focused at the
time. In that election, $6.6 million was spent against the justices, much of it coming
from agricultural and business interests.149 By comparison $4.1 million was spent in
support of the justices.
Even though the public focal point of the anti-retention campaign was the death
penalty; this wasn’t the real concern of the interest groups that were opposing these
justices. They were more concerned about decisions by these liberal justices in favor
of consumers and workers than they were about the death penalty. But these interest
groups used the death penalty as the focal point of their campaign for ousting these
justices. This is something we could see more of in the future: wealthy interests
using an unpopular decision on a wedge social issue to campaign against justices,
when their real agenda has to do with an entirely different set of issues.
Still, the ouster of California’s Supreme Court justices took place a quartercentury ago. And we’ve not often seen judges ousted for high-profile decisions on
divisive social issues in the years since then. Occasionally, as I have mentioned,
justices of state high courts have been ousted but it has not been a frequent
occurrence. So you may wonder whether this is something we really need to worry
about. I think we do.
D. Megatrends
The reason we should worry about Iowa has to do with two megatrends: the
polarization and monetization of American politics. While these megatrends are
related to many aspects of our political system—including who can compete for
office, how districts are drawn, how campaigns get funded, and how legislation gets
passed—I’m going to focus on their impact on judicial elections in particular.
Let me start with polarization. They say a picture is worth a thousand words, and
here’s a political cartoon to prove it. The elephant is saying “I am Right and You
Lie!” as the donkey (a symbol going back to the Jacksonian era) says “No. I’m
Right and You Lie!”
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This image nicely captures something many Americans, think is wrong with
contemporary politics. The parties have little interest and, it would seem, relatively
little incentive to compromise. We live in an age of hyper-polarization, with
approval of Congress at historically low levels. Well sure, you might say, we think
our politics is polarized now, but don’t people in every age think the same thing? It
turns out we really are living in a hyper-polarized era. The best law review article on
the subject is Rick Pildes’ “Why The Center Does Not Hold,”150 which documents
the problem in meticulous detail and attempts to explain it. Professor Pildes
concludes that we really are living in an era of “extreme political polarization,” not
seen since the late 19th Century, around the time of the Civil War. One commentator
has put it this way: “Republicans and Democrats now line up against each other
with regimented precision like soldiers going into battle.”151
But it’s not just politicians who are polarized. As Professor Pildes also
documents, voters too increasingly line up in ideologically consistent ways.152 What
I mean by “ideologically consistent” is that if I know where you stand on abortion, I
can predict where you stand on taxes. If I know where you stand on gay marriage, I
can predict where you stand on environmental regulation. There are, of course,
always some people who have a liberal position on one issue and a conservative
position on another. But across a range of issues, those who study public opinion
find that people are increasingly lining up in very predicable ways. This is true even
of nominally independent voters; those who pay attention to politics and regularly
vote tend to align with one party or another. Split ticket voting has declined sharply
in recent decades. Some people do fall in the middle of the political spectrum, but
they tend to be nonvoters or occasional voters who are less attentive to politics—and
less likely to vote.
What are the causes of extreme polarization in our politics these days? There’s
no definitive answer to this question, though Professor Pildes identifies several
possible causes. Those explanations include polarizing personalities like Bill
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama; primary elections that are
increasingly dominated by the liberal or conservative base, giving candidates little
incentive to tack toward the center; polarization of the news media (think of Fox v.
MSNBC replacing Walter Cronkite); and gerrymandered districts, which makes
incumbent legislators more worried about challenges from the extreme of their own
parties party (from the right for Republicans, the left for Democrats), than a more
moderate challenger from the other party; and the ideological “purification” of the
parties that followed Voting Rights Act, which caused conservative Southern
Democrats to switch parties and may ultimately have led to the extinction of liberal
and moderate Republicans.
I won’t dwell on these possible explanations because, for present purposes, the
causes of political polarization are less important than the effects. At the national
150
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level, gridlock is the most obvious effect. Nowadays, with the increased use of the
filibuster to block any legislation with which one party disagrees, it takes a
supermajority of sixty in the Senate to get anything significant done. And when
there’s divided government, as has been the case for the past several years, there has
to be agreement across the aisle for a bill to become law. The willingness to
compromise, most glaringly evident in the recent debt ceiling impasse, has been one
casualty of the hyper-polarization of our politics. The end result is a breakdown in
governance, especially in circumstances of divided government. The bitterness and
recrimination that surrounds our political process now threatens to spill over into
judicial elections—indeed, it already has. Polarization is part of the explanation for
what happened in Iowa and what could happen more and more often around the
country.
The second megatrend is big money politics. This is something that has been
going on for decades, but has received increasing attention—and deservedly so—in
the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission153 two years ago. We have seen in recent decades, a steep
increase in the amount of money that is being spent in politics generally.
Both total contributions to and spending by presidential candidate have
increased exponentially since 1976.

A similar dynamic has occurred in congressional races. The average U.S. House
winner spent $1.4 million in 2010 and the average winner in the U.S. Senate almost
$10 million. There is also a lot of outside money coming into these races, around
half a million dollars for the average House race and almost $2 million for the
average Senate race. In 2010, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $32 million, the
American Action Network spent $26 million, American Crossroads spent $21.5
million, and Crossroads GPS spent $17 million. That’s a lot of money being spent
by outside groups trying to influence elections. As a matter of current U.S.
constitutional law, starting with Buckley v. Valeo and proceeding through Citizens
United, such independent campaign expenditures by individuals and corporations
cannot be limited. We had an enormous influx of money from Super PAC’s and
153
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nonprofits in the last election cycle, which is sure to continue with a vengeance in
the current election cycle and for the foreseeable future.
Although judicial elections have been something of a laggard, in terms of the
amount of money that’s spent influencing the outcome, the cost of becoming an
elected judge has increased. As late as the 1960s, it was said that judicial elections
were about “as exciting as a game of checkers . . . [p]layed by mail.”154 That has
certainly changed. In the words of one commentator, judicial campaigns have
become “‘nastier, nosier, and costlier.’” 155 Spending doubled between 1990 and
2004. One recent study found that, since 1993, winners in state supreme court races
raised $91 million compared to $53 million raised by losers.156 Another found that
“judicial candidates for state high courts between 1999 and 2006 raised over $157
million, more than twice the amount raised by candidates in the four election cycles
prior combined.”157 The increased competitiveness of judicial elections has led to
changes in how campaigns are conducted, including an added pressure to raise more
funds.158
E. Effects
Why is this a bad thing? A great quotation from a member of Ohio’s state
supreme court encapsulates the problem: “‘I never felt so much like a hooker down
by the bus station . . . as I did in a judicial race. . . . Everyone interested in
contributing has very specific interests. . . . They mean to be buying a vote.’”159 Of
course, this is just one state judge’s perspective, but there’s evidence to back up his
subjective perception. The problem can be broken down into three parts: (1) the
effect on campaigns and election results; (2) the effect on judicial decisionmaking;
and (3) the effect on the legitimacy of state courts.
Contemporary judicial campaigns more closely resemble campaigns for other
elected offices than used to be the case. Candidates solicit contributions, use attack
ads, and make promises about what they’ll do if elected.160 It’s hard to deny that
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money makes a difference in campaigns, allowing candidates to publicize their
candidacies.161 What’s less clear is how much the ability to raise money affects who
can become or remain a state judge. Candidates certainly chase campaign money
because they know, or at least think, it makes a difference. If you can’t raise money,
you can’t expect to compete—and you’ll probably choose not to run and perhaps not
to seek retention. While it’s difficult to pinpoint the precise effect of money on
election results, it appears to be more important for challengers than for
incumbents.162
This is probably because judicial candidates lacking name
recognition depend more on advertising.163 There’s also some evidence, albeit
indirect, that money from wealthy business interests helps. From 2000 to 2004,
“voters elected 36 of 40 judges supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,”
which spent about $100 million over this period of time.164
Even more worrisome than the impact on election results is the effect on judicial
decisionmaking. Campaign contributors often appeared in court before judges to
whom they contributed.165 Judges may favor those who have supported their
campaigns, or whom they hope will do so in the future. Even if the particular
litigant before them hasn’t spent money on their campaign, appellate judges may be
aware that the law they make will affect potential donors or spenders. This problem
is equally severe for judges who face retention elections as it is for those who face a
contested re-election campaign. Just how much does money affect judicial
decisionmaking? It’s hard to draw definitive conclusions from the empirical
research,166 but the best recent evidence provides convincing evidence that some
judges do in fact adjust their decisions to attract votes and campaign money.167
Professors Kang and Shepherd recently examined a dataset that included decisions
by over four hundred state supreme court judges in more than twenty-one thousand
cases over a four-year period.168 They focused on the contributions from business
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groups, which accounted “for almost half of all donations to judicial campaigns.”169
Judges who received campaign contributions from business groups were more likely
to decide cases in favor of business interests.170 They even made a rough attempt to
quantify the relationship between money and decisionmaking, finding that a $1,000
contribution increased the average probability that a judge would vote for a business
litigant by 0.03%, while a $1,000,000 contribution increased that probability by
30%.171
The third way in which money affects the judiciary is legitimacy. Should we
trust a system in which judges depend on money from the very interests if not the
very parties who are affected by their decisions? Many people think not, and with
good reason. Seventy-six percent of voters think that campaign contributions affect
judges’ decisions. The number is even higher here in the state of Ohio. Even judges
themselves agree. While few judges would admit that they are biased, many do
express concerns about the impact that campaign money has on judicial
decisionmaking generally. A 2001 survey found that 50% agreed that campaign
donations influenced courtroom decisions by some judges.172 Most state judges
believed that the tone and conduct of judicial campaigns had gotten worse over the
past five years, and most elected high court justices cited immense pressure to raise
campaign money during their election years.173 There is a conflict of interest
between the judicial obligation to interpret and apply the law impartially, and their
personal interest in seeking reelection or retention—an interest that, as a practical
matter, requires them to take money from people and entities with a stake in their
decisions. Such a system presents serious legitimacy concerns.174
F. Conclusion
What can be done? This is a very difficult problem, and there are no easy
answers. One possible solution is to require recusal of judges with conflicts. The
U.S. Supreme Court required recusal a couple of years ago in the case of Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,175 but only because the conflict was so egregious. This
ruling won’t solve the broader problems of money affecting who becomes or
remains a judge, the decisions they make as judges, and ultimate the legitimacy of
state’s judicial systems. Another possibility is to provide better information for
voters. There may be room for improvement at the margins, but it doesn’t seem
terribly likely that ordinary citizens will pay more attention to judicial elections than
169
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they currently do. And even if they do, it doesn’t solve the independence problem—
and might even exacerbate it, enhancing the prospect of judges being punished for
ruling in favor of criminal defendants, gays and lesbians, religious minorities, or
other unpopular groups. We could impose stricter limitations on campaign
contributions and enhance disclosure rules. As a matter of First Amendment law,
however, you can’t limit independent expenditures by outside groups, including
those funded with corporate money. We could try to raise the floor rather than
lowering the ceiling through public funding for judicial elections. But in another
recent decision, Arizona Free Enterprise Club Freedom Club PAC v. Federal
Election Commission, the Supreme Court has severely hampered those efforts by
preventing public funding from being targeted to those contests in which it’s needed
most. Finally, we could have life tenure for state judges, eliminating elections
entirely, but this is likely to run into fierce public opposition. A possible fallback
position is a fixed term of years with no possibility of reappointment. That would
fix the real problem, the incentive for judges to cater either to an angry electorate or
well-financed interest groups.
Iowa’s 2010 election was a sad event, not only for gay and lesbian rights but also
for those who care about judicial independence. But like any good crisis, Iowa
presents us with a great opportunity to change things for the better. My personal
preference would be for states to get rid of judicial elections altogether and move to
the federal model, which offers much greater insulation from money and
partisanship. It is not my purpose, however, to prescribe any particular solution.
Movement to the federal model is not likely to be realistic in most places. And the
best politically feasible solution will likely vary from state to state. What I do insist
on is the idea that, as lawyers, we have a special obligation to call attention to the
importance of judicial independence and the threat that exists from our current
system of judicial elections. I commend Chief Justice Ternus for using her personal
experience to call attention to this critical issue, and hope that all of you will be
moved to action by this experience.
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